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FINE-TUNING TASINI: PRIVILEGES OF
ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION AND
REPRODUCTION*
t
Wendy J. Gordon

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
is arguably the soundest copyright court in the nation. In
Tasini v. New York Times,' it handled a challenge brought by
a group of freelance writers against publishers and database
proprietors. The controversy, now pending in the United States
Supreme Court, has wide importance because it will determine
what entitlements attach to a publisher who purchases a privilege to include a freelancer's story in the publisher's magazine
or newspaper. Essentially, the issue is whether a publisher,
who has not purchased the story's copyright and has not obtained an explicit agreement regarding electronic rights, may
nevertheless exploit the story electronically.
All parties in Tasini concede that the copyrights lay with
the freelancers.2 Nevertheless, the defendants put the
freelancers' contributions online and into CD-ROMs and made
them available for individual download by consumers-all
without consulting or compensating the copyright owners.'
©2000 Wendy J. Gordon. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University
School of Law. I am grateful to Bob Bone, Jane Ginsburg, Val Gurvitz, Jessica
Litman, Mike Meurer, and Lloyd Weinreb for discussion of this Essay. I also want
to express my thanks to the many wonderful colleagues at Brooklyn Law School
who made my serving as Scholar-in-Residence at Brooklyn a pleasure as well as
an honor.
Please note that I am a member of the National Writer's Union, whose
president is the named plaintiff in the case discussed herein. Opinions expressed
in this Essay are solely my own.
' Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2000), amending
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 192 F.3d 356 (1999), cert. granted sub nom. New
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 425 (Mem) (2000) [hereinafter Tasini II].
2 Id. at 165.

Id. at 164-65.
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The publishers defended their actions by claiming a privilege
under a provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright
Act") that authorizes a presumptive privilege to republish
"under certain limited circumstances."' The Second Circuit,
however, rebuffed the defendants' view. Indeed, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that if print publishers want
electronic rights from the freelancers with whom they deal,
they must obtain those rights by specific agreements.5
In the course of a generally sound decision, however, the
court glossed over some matters of statutory application, and it
may have been a bit overly generous to the plaintiffs. It is
worth setting these details right lest they obscure the straightforward slam-dunk at the core of the plaintiffs' case. Thus, this
Essay's key point is statutory: Regardless of whether the making of a digital collection infringes a freelancer's right of
reproduction, the publisher and his database licensee clearly
infringe the right of distribution when they make the article
available for individual downloads. In addition, this Essay addresses some of the ethical and economic aspects of the controversy over electronic rights.
Specifically, Part I summarizes Tasini and analyzes key
sections of the Second Circuit and district court opinions. Part
II examines three aspects of the statutory provision under
seek shelter: (1) the limited privilege to
which the publishers
"reproduce"6 the freelance contribution; (2) the separate and
equally limited privilege to "distribute" the contribution; and
(3) the statutory requirement that both privileges only apply to
a freelance contribution that is reproduced or distributed "as
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
available at 1976 WL 14045. The provision at issue is the second sentence of 17
U.S.C. § 201(c):
(c) Contributions to Collective Works.-Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective
work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In
the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 171.
6

Id.

Id.
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part of' a larger whole.' Part HI briefly discusses the
alienability of the privileges.9 Finally, Part IV examines some
of the ethical and economic implications of the Tasini decision.
Regarding the freelancers' rights of reproduction' and
the corresponding publishers' privilege, this Essay suggests
that the Second Circuit correctly held that the NEXIS database, and a similarly constructed CD-ROM, embodied infringing reproductions." These computer versions did not attempt
to replicate or revise entire print issues; accordingly, they
could not constitute, under the applicable statutory presumptive privilege, a later edition or "revision of that collective
work." 2 Therefore, they exceeded the privilege. Nevertheless,
this Essay concedes that the court may have been overbroad in
holding that all the computer texts were infringing reproductions. 3 Conceivably, there was no violation of the reproduction right in those few instances where a defendant's website
or CD-ROM reproduced the exact format and full content of
their magazine or newspaper as a unified whole.
Even if a particular digital product can be considered a
privileged "revision" and therefore lawfully made-and this Essay expresses no opinion about whether exact full-format digital reproductions fall within the statutory privilege-infringement can still occur because freelancers have not only a reproduction right, but also an exclusive right of distribution.'
This Essay points out that regardless of whether including an
article in an online database or CD-ROM infringes the copyright owner's right of reproduction, a publisher exceeds his
privilege of distribution when he allows individual articles to
be downloaded because making an individual article available
for download is not distributing it as "part of' the whole. Thus,
such an act exceeds the applicable privilege. Furthermore, it is
not redeemed by the possibility that a person at home who is

8Id.
9 Id.
'0 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000) (granting the exclusive right of reproduction to

copyright owners).
11 Tasini II,
12 17 U.S.C.
13 Tasini II,
" 17 U.S.C.

owners).

206 F.3d at 168-69.
§ 201(c) (2000).
206 F.3d at 170.
§ 106(3) (granting the exclusive right of distribution to copyright
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receiving the download may be shielded by the fair use doctrine.15 Regardless of whether a home user is making an infringing reproduction, the act of distribution is separately cognizable.
I. THE TASINI DECISION: BACKGROUND
Jonathan Tasini is the president of the National Writers'
Union. He and several other freelance writers brought suit
against their publishers and several proprietors of electronic
databases, most notably Mead Data, the owner of LEXISNEXIS. The complaint alleged that the publishers infringed
the freelancers' copyright when they published the freelancers'
articles electronically or licensed the database proprietors to
distribute their articles, in both instances without obtaining
the freelancers' permission or paying them anything beyond
what was initially paid to publish the article."
The legal background is straightforward. The Constitution
empowers Congress to give authors exclusive rights in their
writings for limited times." Therefore, Congress promulgated
the Copyright Act,' 8 which secures federal copyrights to everyone who writes, records music, takes photographs, or otherwise
The fair use doctrine privileges behavior that might otherwise be infringing.
It finds statutory recognition in 17 U.S.C. § 107. That Section provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall indude(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
1 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 163.
17 U.S. CONST., art. I § 8 cl. 8.
" 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
5
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fixes a work of creative authorship "in any tangible medium of
expression.""9 Initial copyright ownership inheres in the creative persons themselves," unless they produce the items as
"works for hire."2' Moreover, copyrights are not lost when an
author or artist sells an individual copy-even if that copy is
the original and only fixation of the work." A copyright owner
can assign her copyright only if such assignment is in writing
and signed by the copyright owner or her agent.s
Thus, under the Copyright Act, a company that publishes
a magazine or newspaper owns the copyrights only of three
classes of writers: company employees, non-employees who
assign a copyright interest to the publisher and execute a writing memorializing the assignment," and non-employees who
have composed something for the publisher "on commission"
and who sign a work for hire agreement.26 Without a written
agreement or an employer-employee relationship, the publisher
can obtain only a non-exclusive license to publish.
In everyday terms, a non-exclusive license to publish a
work is "permission" to publish." A layperson might even call
1' Id.

§ 102.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
21 "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer . . . is considered the
author." Id. § 201(b); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
22 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
- Id. § 204(a).
§ 201(b). "A work made for hire is (1) a work prepared by an employee
24 Id.
20

within the scope of his or her employment .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work
made for hire").
25 A contractual transfer of copyright is valid only if it "is in writing and
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized
agent." 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). A non-exclusive license is not a "transfer of copyright
ownership," see 17 U.S.C. § 101, and therefore, it does not have to be in writing.
See Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 1992).
2 "[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work" can be a work for hire "if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire." 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining "work made for hire").
' This common-sense point was obscured in Tasini by the courts comment
that "each Author owns the copyright in an individual work and . . . has neither
licensed nor otherwise transferred any rights under it to a Publisher or electronic
database. These works were published with the Authors' consent, however, in particular editions of the periodicals owned by the Publishers." Tasini II, 206 F.3d
161, 165 (2nd Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). The sentences could not mean what
they literally say because if there is "consent," there is, by definition, a "Iicense"-ordinarily a non-exclusive one. Probably, in penning this sentence, the
court had in mind only "exclusive licenses."
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it a "right" to publish. For example, a guest in a private home
might say to a stranger contesting her presence, "I have a
right to be here," which means, "I have permission to be here."
However, in the Hohfeldian terms that lawyers use when they
wish to be precise, a non-exclusive license is a "privilege,""
generated by the copyright owner's partial waiver of her right
to exclude. Unlike a transfer of copyright, non-exclusive licenses are not required to be in writing. Instead, they can flow
from conversations and overall dealings between the parties or
by operation of law."
Ordinarily, non-exclusive licenses, or "privileges," can be
subdivided as finely as rights and their assignment." There28 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as

Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913); see also WESLEY NEwCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (W. Cook
ed. 1923).
A Hohfeldian "right" involves the ability to call upon the government to act.
HOHEELD, supra, at 37. In the Hohfeldian scheme, for every "right" there is a
corresponding "duty." HOHFELD, supra, at 38. It is this right/duty pairing that the
right-holder can call upon the government to enforce. Someone who has non-exclusive permission to use a resource owned by another is freed from his or her ordinary duty to refrain from using the item. However, the person with such a nonexclusive license has no "rights" to exclude third parties from the resource because
(by definition) his license is non-exclusive. Therefore, all he has is a liberty of use.
Such liberty is termed a "privilege" by Hohfeld-a freedom from governmentally
imposed duties. HOHFELD, supra, at 42.
Hohfeld calls right and duty "correlatives" of each other because if one person
has a right, some other person must, logically, possess a duty. HOHFELD, supra, at
38. He calls duties and privileges "opposites" because the same person cannot
simultaneously possess both a duty and a privilege regarding the same resource or
action. HOHFELD, supra, at 39. (I am grateful to Matt Neal for that formulation.)
The opposite of a right is the apt but awkwardly named "no-right"-that is, a "noright" is the lack of power to use the state to compel behavior. In sum, the possessor of a non-exclusive license has a "privilege" to do what the license permits.
The owner has "no right" to stop him (at least, he has no right to do so until the
privilege is revoked) but the non-exclusive licensee has "no rights" to use the power of the state against third parties. By contrast, the possessor of an exclusive license has the ability to exclude third parties according to the terms of the license.
Such a person has Hohfeldian rights as well as privileges. Logically, as well as
statutorily, only the possessor of an exclusive right is in line to qualify as an
owner of property. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership");
see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
2 Pinkham, 983 F.2d at 831 ("[Ulnlike an exclusive license, an authorization
can be given orally or implied from conduct.").
3 The principles that counsel against alienability, tend to apply with different
force when rights are waived rather than transferred. In a waiver (i.e. the grant of
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fore, a separate non-exclusive license can apply to each aspect
of the copyright owner's many exclusive rights. 1 Each such
grant of permission can be quite valuable. In particular, someone who has the appropriate permission to use another
person's work can join that work to other works in such a way
that she creates a copyrightable work of her own-a "compilation." In the case of compilations, the new copyright does not
attach to the individual items, of which the compilation is
comprised, but rather it attaches to the selection and ordering
of the items." A compilation of individually copyrightable articles (such as a magazine, newspaper, or encyclopedia) is
called a "collective work," and a "collective work" copyright can
co-exist with the individual authors' copyrights.33 Indeed, according to the statute, "Copyright in each separate contribution
to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective
work as a whole. . .. "
Typically, an individual magazine will be subject to many
copyrights. For example, assume that the publisher who owns
the copyright in a "collective work" (e.g., a magazine) has obtained permission, but no assignments of copyright, from others. Then, side-by-side with the publisher's collective-work
copyright, photographers will own the copyrights in their respective photographs, advertising agencies will own the copyrights in their respective advertisements, the publisher will
own the copyright in any article written by his employees in
the scope of their employment, and freelancer writers will own
the copyrights in the works they have contributed. Consequently, a third party who copied the entire magazine would
violate all of these copyrights, and he would be liable both to

a privilege) the right-holder does not alienate himself from the right but instead
merely allows another to share in its exercise. See Wendy J. Gordon & Sam
Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 152-54
(1998).
" See 17 U.S.C § 106 (codifying exclusive rights of copyright holders that can
be subdivided and separately conveyed); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, available at 1976 WL 14045 (endorsing "the principle of divisibility of copyright").
"2 A compilation can exist either in an assembly of items that are not themselves copyrightable (e.g. a set of statistics) or of an assembly of elements that
may be individually copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "compilation"). The
latter scenario is the fact pattern in Tasini.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
34 Id.
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the publisher as owner of the copyright in the "collective work"
and to the owners of the copyrights in the individual articles,
photographs, and ads. Thus, to lawfully reproduce the entire
magazine, the third party would need the permission of all the
copyright owners. Furthermore, although the owner of copyright in the collective work himself may have a privilege to
reproduce a photograph or article for a particular purpose, he
does not necessarily have any legal power to convey general
privileges of reproduction to others.
Ordinarily, someone who bargains for one privilege (such
as the privilege to print a freelance article in a magazine or
newspaper) only receives what he has bargained for. However,
sometimes bargains are unclear or expensive to specify fully,
and for these and other reasons, the law may create presumptions as to their scope. Under § 201(c)," such a presumption
affects the dealings between publishers and freelancers. In relevant part, § 201(c) provides:
Contributions to Collective Works .... In the absence of an express
transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the

privilege of reproducingand distributingthe contribution as part of
that particularcollective work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series."

It is upon this presumptive privilege that the publishers and
database providers in Tasini rested their defense. The defendants argued that the database collections of articles were
"revisions" of the newspapers or magazines for which the
plaintiff freelancers voluntarily had contributed material.37
Furthermore, they argued that there was nothing in the dealings of the parties to contradict this presumption.38 Therefore,
since § 201(c) presumptively authorizes publishers to reproduce
and distribute "revisions," the defendants claimed that they
" The Second Circuit withdrew its first Tasini opinion to substitute a slightlyamended version, which changed most of the references to "privilege" to "presumptive privilege." Apparently, this was to emphasize that the privilege was not a
mandatory privilege and that it could be eliminated by the parties' agreement.
Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 106.
38 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (emphasis added).
' Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 809 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 206
F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. New York Times Co. v, Tasini,
121 S. Ct. 425 (2000) [hereinafter Tasini 1].
38 Id. at 810-12.
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were authorized to put the freelancers' articles online and into
CD-ROM form, and that they could convey this purported authorization to database publishers."
Of course, the plaintiffs disagreed. They challenged the
notion that § 201(c) could be interpreted so broadly. Furthermore, they argued that whatever privilege is granted by § 201
could not be transferred." Unfortunately, the statute nowhere
defines a privileged "revision" under § 201(c), and it takes no
explicit stand on the issue of transferability.4 ' Thus, it will be
useful to examine § 201(c) in some depth.
II. THE PRESUMTIVE PRIVILEGE AND iTS SCOPE
Section 201(c) is part of a complex set of statutory provisions, but its legislative history provides some assistance. To
clarify the language, "only the privilege of reproducingand distributing the contribution as part of that particularcollective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series," the House Report provided examples:
Under the language of this clause a publishing company could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine,
and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia
in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different
magazine or other collective work. 2

Digital databases hardly seem to fall within these common-sense guidelines. Moreover, a website that enables downloading of individual articles is distributing those individual
articles.43 Such a use falls outside of the narrow privilege that

31 Id.

at 806.
10Id. at 815.
41 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 201.
42 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C-.AN.
5659, available at 1976 WL 14045.
' The average web-surfer thinks of downloading as an act that he or she performs as the sole active party. For example, when an attorney uses NEXIS,
LEXIS, or WESTLAW to retrieve an article, she probably imagines that her computer sends a message that opens a drawer of the database, whereupon the attorney's computer makes a snapshot copy of the desired contents and brings the
copy home. That mental picture errs in several ways, most importantly by depicting the database and its server as passive. To the contrary, the servers actually
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allows the publisher only to reprint and distribute the individual article "as part of' a larger whole. This Essay argues that
the enabling of downloads resolves any doubts about the permissibility of the defendants' conduct with regard to NEXIS."
Before reaching that question, however, the definition of a key
word in § 201(c), "revision," should be addressed.
A. The Nature of a "Revision". Comparingthe View of the
Second Circuit and the District Court
The district court had deliberately interpreted the term
"revision" quite broadly," and it employed a two-step logic
that implicitly placed the definitional burden on the plaintiffs.
First, the court asked whether the database was "substantially
similar" to the printed issue of the periodical and "recognizable" as a version of those periodicals.46 This inquiry deliberately paralleled the inquiry into what constitutes an infringing
use; the classic test for determining if a work infringes
another's copyright is whether the two works are "substantially similar."' Using that test, the district court indeed concluded that enough of the original work's selection had been
preserved so that the database would have infringed the print
periodicals if done without the publishers' permission.48 The
district court then came to its second step: asking whether "the
resulting work might be so different in character from that
load the article from their databases and send it to the customer's personal computer. See, e.g., Chris Hughes & Gunther Birznieks, Serving Up Webserver Basics,
at http//webcompare.internet.comwebbasics/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2001).
Admittedly, there is no perfect match between the Copyright Act's notion of-"distribution" and what happens when a database server enables a download. See
Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway"." Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright In Cyberspace, 95 CoLUm. L. REV. 1466, 1482 (1995).
Nevertheless, the cases holding that the server's behavior constitutes "distribution"
seem justifiable. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
" See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). The two CD-ROM products involve different technology than the online database. A CD-ROM copy of a collective work may not necessarily "distribute" individual articles.
' Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 819-20, 824.
'6 Id. at 821-25.

47 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ch.13, § 13.03

(2000).
48 "[If NEXIS was produced without the permission of The New York Times or
Newsday or Time, these publishers would have valid claims of copyright infringement against MEAD." Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 826.
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collective work which preceded it that it cannot fairly be
deemed a revision."49 Concluding that such a "difference" had
not been shown, the district court found the database privileged.50
Thus, the district court, in its discussion of substantial
similarity, came dangerously close to defining a privileged
"revision" as if the category embraced anything that used a
substantial part of the print periodical.5 1 An example can help
clarify why such a view would be inappropriate. Assume, for
example, that someone had made an exciting collection of short
poems. If the collector had the poets' permission to make the
anthology, his "selection or arrangement" of the poems could
give him a collective work copyright, and he would have all the
presumptive privileges that are granted under § 201(c). Assume also that later a composer used all but one of the poems,
in the same sequence, as lyrics for an opera. That opera would
be a "derivative work" of both the anthology and the copied
poems, infringing if it was done without permission. It would
infringe both the collector's ordering and selection of the poems
and the individual poets' language.5 2 Although the composer
might settle his lawsuit with the anthologist, he still would be
liable to the individual poets. No one would imagine that §
201(c) would authorize anthologists to create musical versions.
Thus, of the immense number of potentially infringing works
that can be made from a collective work, only a small subset
would constitute "revisions."
The Second Circuit recognized that the issues arising under § 201(c) were quite different from those arising in cases
addressing whether a collective work is infringing because it is
"substantially similar" to another. Therefore, the Second Cir-

4 Id. at 825.
,OId. at 826.

This Essay suggests that the district court was influenced by the incorrect
view that it would be "anomalous" for something "substantially similar" not to
constitute a "revision" under § 201(c). See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F.
Supp. 841, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion for reconsideration). Nevertheless,
it should be noted that the district court pulled back from treating "substantial
similarity" as the sole test for determining whether a database constituted a privileged "revision." Id.
" Thus, the owner of the collective-work copyright could successfully sue the
composer, as could the owners of copyright in the individual poems.
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cuit properly put aside the "substantial similarity" analysis53
and the notion that the plaintiffs had to prove any special
"difference. " ' Instead, it focused on how the daily and
monthly periodicals had been virtually dissolved in the NEXIS
database and on how the databases were primarily used-to
provide end users access to "the preexisting materials that
belong to the individual author.""5 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit found the database not to constitute a permissible
"revision."56
Furthermore, the Second Circuit was concerned that the
publishers' reading of the statute "would cause the exception to
swallow the rule."5 7 The court wrote, "[Wiere the permissible
uses under § 201(c) as broad and as transferable as appellees
contend, it is not clear that the rights retained by the Authors
could be considered 'exclusive' in any meaningful sense." 8
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that interpreting "revision"
too broadly would make part of § 201(c) superfluous.5 9 Recall
that the provision gives a presumptive privilege to "a later
collective work in the same series" as well as to "revisions" of
the particular collective work. 0 If a "revision" is defined so
broadly as to embrace any electronic database that takes some
of what the print publisher selected for inclusion, "revision" is
so broad as to leave no need for the specific mention of "collective work in the same series."6 ' Yet the statute also contains
the latter phrase. Since a statute should be construed in a way
that gives meaning to each of its parts, construing a statute in
a way that makes part of it redundant should be avoided.
In rejecting the broad interpretation of "revision," the Second Circuit is persuasive. Given what Congress intended when
enacting the provision,62 it seems absurd to contend that pub-

Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168-69, 169 n.4.
at 169 n.4.

54 Id.

5"Id. at 169.
a6 Id.
57 Id. at 168.

"5Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168.
59Id.
so17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
61 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 167.
6'In the eyes of at least one court, "[C]ongress passed the section to enlarge
the rights of authors." Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
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lishers who pay for print rights should also presumptively have
free rein to sell mass licenses to electronic media. Most importantly, in what I view as the crux of the opinion, the court
noted:
[Slection 201(c) would not permit a Publisherto sell a hard copy of
an Author's article directly to the public even if the Publisher also
offered for individual sale all of the other articles from the particular
edition. We see nothing in the revision provision that would allow
the Publishers to achieve the same goal indirectly through
NEXIS.u

The opinion, however, did not anchor this consideration as
firmly in the statutory language as it might have. This is because the court never focused on § 201(c)'s "as part of' language. In fact, the court saw the central issue somewhat differently. For the Second Circuit, "[tlhe crux of the dispute is ...
whether one or more of the pertinent electronic databases may
be considered a 'revision' of the individual periodical issues
from which the articles were taken." Such a formulation ignores "distribution" and places all its weight on the "reproduction" prong of the privilege.' This is troublesome because the

' Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added).
'4 Id. at 165.
" When a freelancer's writing is put into a CD-ROM or an online database of
articles, the step that fixes the digital version in a physical medium is "reproduction." This point assumes that making the online website involves initially storing
the material on one or more hard drives. Websites cannot be maintained solely in
RAM form. It is far from clear that ephemeral RAM storage should be governed
by the "reproduction right." Not only is there a separate display right available
under the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000), but the legislative history to the Copyright Act states that "the definition of 'fixation'. . . exclude[s] from the concept
purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a
screen, shown electronically or a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured
momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, available at 1976 WL 14045. It is difficult to
see a difference between "reproduction" and "fixation" under the statute-and this
Essay argues that neither should be satisfied by manifestation in RAM. The practical issues here are large. If appearance in RAM is merely a "display," then the
applicable right only gives the copyright owner power when the display is made
"publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Since the copyright owner's display rights are limited to "public" displays, private users of the Internet get some shelter. On the
contrary, if appearance in RAM form would be considered a "reproduction," even
private actions by individual consumers at their home computers would trigger a
copyright owner's prima facie right. To hold that every private person is "copying"
when they receive something in RAM may extend the copyright owners' rights
impermissibly, creating problems both for free speech and for privacy. See, e.g.,
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panel is not fully persuasive regarding the production of databases that, unlike NEXIS, contain full-text and full-format
imaging of the collective works.
When analyzing a particular digital version that seems to
have contained full-format exact copies, the Second Circuit
ruled that such a version also infringed. The court reasoned,
"Although this database contains scanned photo-images of editions of The New York Times Sunday book review and magazine, it also contains articles from numerous other periodicals.
In this respect, then, it is also substantially similar to NEXIS,
and it, too, is at best a new anthology."66 If the book review
and magazine sections of the New York Times are independent
"collective works," it is hard to imagine that merely collecting
several verbatim, full-format issues of each on a disk together
with other fully-copied periodicals makes a new "version" that
exceeds the privilege,6 7 any more than a library infringes a
copyright holder's rights when it binds journal issues together
in a hard-cover volume. The court here seems to be falling into
the same kind of error as exhibited in the much-criticized opin68
ion in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,
where the Ninth Circuit found it improper to mount a photograph on a ceramic back without the permission of the copyright owner.6 9 One could well imagine that other circuit
courts, or the Supreme Court, would disagree with the Second
Circuit on this issue. Indeed, the availability of the § 201(c)
privilege should not depend on whether several complete issues of a given magazine or newspaper appear together on the

Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
40 (1994). Interestingly, Congress recently overturned the case most often relied on
when arguing that reading material into RAM can constitute a violation of the reproduction right. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993), overturned by Title III of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (1998)). Congress did not alter the general
definition of "reproduction" in this piecemeal correction. The § 117(c) exemption
applies only if a "copy" has been made, without specifying whether RAM constitutes something solid enough to be a "copy." Nevertheless, the sequence does indicate that assimilating RAM into "reproduction" can have undesirable consequences.
6 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 170 (discussing "General Periodicals OnDisk').
This should be contrasted with the way a database, like NEXIS, dissolves
one periodical into a sea of writings.
" 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
69 Id. For an astute opinion declining to follow Mirage, see Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,
125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).

2000]

TASINI AND A PUBLISHERS' PRESUMPTIVE PRIVILEGE

487

same computer disks or are available on the same web site.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit may be correct in rejecting § 201(c)'s applicability to exact and full-format digital reproductions. For example, the legislative history of § 201(c)
indicates that, in 1976, Congress believed that "[tihe basic presumption of § 201(c) is fully consistent with present law and
practice, and represents a fair balancing of the equities.""
Therefore, in interpreting the undefined word, "revision," reference might be made both to 1976-era practice and general
fairness. It is quite possible that, through these lenses, anything intended to give profit through exploiting individual
articles would not be seen as a "revision." This Essay takes no
position on that question. Rather, this Essay emphasizes that
regardless of whether reproducing a particular digital version
constitutes a "revision," lawfully produced under § 201(c), making individual items available for download is a "distribution"
that infringes a freelancer's copyright.
This distinction can be important because the Supreme
Court might conceivably hold that a publisher is privileged
under § 201(c) if he reproduces the freelancers' articles as part
of a full-format, full-text digital version of his periodical. If the
Supreme Court took this step, an issue would arise over
whether a publisher could also provide a download option for
such a digital version. This Essay argues that the answer
would be "no": before any online database can lawfully distribute individual downloads, and regardless of whether the database itself was lawfully made, the database must have permission from the freelancers who own the copyrights in the
individual articles.
B. IndividualDownloads
The § 201(c) presumptive privilege applies to two distinct
rights of a copyright owner: the reproduction right and the
distribution right.7 When a later edition or revision of a
newspaper or encyclopedia is printed, § 201(c) allows the publisher to reproduce copies of freelance articles that were li-

10H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.O.A.N. 5659,
available at 1976 WL 14045.
1 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) ("privilege of reproducing and distributing").
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censed earlier; this is the "reproduction" aspect of § 201(c). 7 2
In addition, the publisher can sell that later edition or revision; this is the "distribution" aspect of § 201(c).73 "Reproduction" and "distribution" are separate rights under federal copyright law.74 Section 201(c) provides that such reproduction
and distribution can occur only "as part of" the later edition or
revision.7 5 Thus, a publisher violates the law by either a reproduction or a distribution that takes place not "as part of" a
"revision."76 It is fairly well established that sending an image
or text out for download constitutes an act of distribution.7 7

72

Id.

73 Id.
71 Id. § 106(1) (granting exclusive right of reproduction); id.
§ 106(3) (granting
exclusive right of distribution).
71 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
7' Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
7' See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (concluding that 'Webbworld 'distributed' PEI's copyrighted works
by allowing its users to download and print copies of electronic image files"); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding the
operator of a subscription online bulletin board service liable for infringing distribution). In cases like Frena, the question usually concerns the relatively passive
role of the electronic service provider, who may have no knowledge of what is
posted or what is downloaded. By contrast, defendants in Tasini either provide
content or maintain their own websites. Thus, no plausible issue of ignorance can
be raised.
It may not matter whether plaintiffs can specifically prove that their individual articles were downloaded. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997). In Hotaling, the defendant argued that
"holding a work in a library collection that is open to the public constitutes, at
most, an offer to distribute the work. In order to establish distribution, the [defendant] argue[d], the evidence would need to show that a member of the public accepted such an offer." Id. A similar issue may arise in Tasini. The defendants may
argue that holding a work on a database open to individual downloads does not
amount to distribution without proof that the database actually sent out an article
in response to a download request. The Hotaling court rejected such a view and
held the defendant liable:
When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing
or browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the public. At that point, members of the public can visit the
library and use the work. Were this not to be considered distribution
within the meaning of § 106(3), a copyright holder would be prejudiced
by a library that does not keep records of public use, and the library
would unjustly profit by its own omission.
Id. Similarly, making the individual works available for download, in circumstances where it is virtually certain that some such individual downloads occurred, may
be sufficient.
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A focus on the freelancers' exclusive right of distribution78
also disposes of a red herring introduced by the defendants,
namely, contributory infringement based on the acts of end
users.79 Whether end users are sheltered by the fair use doctrine when downloading from the defendants' web sites is irrelevant because at the same time as a consumer is reproducing
the article in question, the database proprietor is distributing
the article-an act of direct, not contributory, infringement.
Each act-the consumer's reproduction, the service's distribution, and the print publisher's assistance in the distribution and making of the database-is a separate candidate for
copyright infringement.80 Was a database distributing individual articles? Did a publisher act to further that end? If so,
both the database proprietor (as a direct infringer) and the
print publisher (as an entity that contributed to and induced
the database proprietor's infringing distribution") are liable
for distributing a copyrighted item in a way that is not "part
of' a collective work. The end users have nothing to do with it.
Furthermore, a large commercial database service like
NEXIS can be infringing even if many of its customers are
engaged in fair use.82 Economic analysis suggests that when
7 Admittedly, the plaintiffs do not seem to have

explicitly focused on the

defendants' active role in distributing downloads. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint contains several allegations that downloading occurred and
that the distribution right was violated both directly and contributorily. See
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at
40, 48, 49, 350, 358 and 359, Tasini v. New
York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 93 Civ. 8678), available at
httpi//www.nwu.org/tvtttvtcompl.htm (visited Feb. 16, 2001).
"' For the defendants' arguments regarding contributory infringement and fair
use, see Defendants' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22-26, Tasini v. New York
Times Co., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov.
6, 2000) (No. 00-201).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
""One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 1485 (citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
82 Cf. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1558 ("One who distributes copyrighted material
for profit is engaged in a commercial use even if the customers supplied with such
material themselves use it for personal use."). Admittedly, if all individual consumer uses are fair, that tends to suggest that whatever enables the fair uses to
occur should also be noninfringing. Thus, if a commercial service has enabled
another person's fair use, that should be relevant to the treatment given the commercial entity. But nothing mandates that the individual and the distributional
entity must be treated exactly the same. To the contrary, it is well established
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transaction cost difficulties provide the reason for fair use
treatment, the fair use doctrine might legitimately give less
generous treatment to centralized commercial entities than to
the individual consumers whom the entities serve.83
Perhaps as a way of escaping the "as part of" limitation,
the publishers apparently argued that "whether an electronic
database infringes upon an individual author's article would
essentially turn upon whether the rest of the articles from the
particular edition in which the individual article was published
could also be retrieved individually."" Such an argument
seems to imagine that an article can be considered distributed
"as part of' a collective work whenever a consumer could, by a
properly worded search, call up the remainder of the periodical
in which the article appeared. However, it does not much matter whether the other articles could be retrieved with others.
What is crucial is that the electronic distribution did not require that the individual articles be retrieved only in the context of the entire edition.85 By providing individual downloads, the distribution exceeds the presumptive privilege--even
if such privilege is available for the act of making the electronic version. To repeat: The Copyright Act explicitly allows redistribution of the individually-owned articles only "as part of' a
collective work, a revision, or a later edition, and not individu86
ally.

under the fair use doctrine that the commercial character of a use can make a
significant difference. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600 (1982).
84 Tasini II, 206 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1999).
Thus, the Second Circuit wrote:
lilt is significant that neither the publishers nor NEXIS evince any intent to compel, or even to permit, an end user to retrieve an individual
work only in connection with other works from the edition in which it
ran. Quite the contrary, the New York Times actually forbids NEXIS
from producing "facsimile reproductions" of particular editions.
Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 169 (citing Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. 804, 826 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
'6 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
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III. TRANSFERABILITY
The court declined to reach the question of assignability of
the privilege. 7 Nevertheless, several sections of the opinion
intimated that the court thought that the privilege could not
be transferred." Therefore, since a significant scope for a
privilege under § 201(c) remains after Tasini, it is important to
clarify whether the privilege can be assigned and (a separate
and interesting question) whether it can be shared. If both are
prohibited, then the privilege attaches inalienablyto the initial
publisher who purchases a license to publish the freelancer's
work.
To hold the privilege inalienable would be overbroad. Inalienability would mean that any time a publishing company is
sold, no § 201(c) privilege adheres to the collective works that
are sold with it. Similarly, publishers often buy and sell entire
collective-work copyrights. Indeed, it is hardly remarkable for
one publisher to sell all her rights in a particular encyclopedia
to another publisher. When that occurs, the privilege to reprint
the entire set is expected to accompany the sale. However, if

"7 Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 165 & n.2. Footnote 2 was added in the final version
of the opinion, but it was not present in the withdrawn version. It is unclear
what the note adds because the opinion already stated, "We need not, and do not,
reach the question whether this privilege is transferable under Section 201(d)." Id.
at 165. By comparison, footnote 2 states, "We also do not consider the issue of
assignability. Rather, we assume for purposes of this decision only, that the Publishers had the right to assign the articles in question to Mead and UMI." Id. at
165 n.2. Perhaps the footnote was intended to explain away all mentions of transferability in the opinion as arguendo assumptions.
" Thus, in summarizing the statute, the court writes, "Section 201(c) creates a
presumption that when the author of an article gives the publisher the author's
permission to include the article in a collective work, as here, the author also
gives a non-assignable, non-exclusive privilege to use the article as identified in
the statute." Id. at 166 (emphasis added). Conceivably the court's comments here
arose merely out of indulging arguendo the publishers' arguments that the privilege could be transferred. See id. at 165 n.2. But the language about assignability
seems to go further. Incidentally, even where entitlements cannot be assigned,
privileges can sometimes be shared and rights can sometimes be waived. However,
the court does not address the distinction between assignment and other powers.
For another hint that the court thinks the presumptive privilege is non-transferable, the final opinion added quotation marks around the word "privilege," as if to
distinguish it from transferable "right" in a context where rights are statutorily
transferable and privileges have no such express transferability. Tasini II, 206
F.3d at 168 n.3. The addition of these quotation marks is one of the few changes
that the final opinion made to the material appearing in the withdrawn opinion.
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the § 201(c) privilege were not transferable, the buyer of an
encyclopedia title could not do new press runs of the encyclopedia because it would be an infringing reproduction.89 Such a
result would be absurd.
This Essay suggests that the Copyright Act itself offers a
compromise position between the inalienability apparently
proposed by the plaintiffs and the full transferability apparently proposed by the defendants. According to the statute, the
privilege inheres in "the owner of copyright in the collective
work."" This phrase can be interpreted as referencing a status rather than an individual. If so, when there is a change in
the identity of the owner of the collective-work copyright, the
holder of the privilege would change as well. The privilege
could and would attach to the new owner, appurtenant to the
ownership of copyright in the entire collective work.
Of course, this does not end all issues of transfer. In
Tasini, the publishers may have tried to license a use of their
purported privilege to the database proprietors as a bare license-that is, without selling the overall copyright.91 However, such a bare license might not suffice to carry the privilege
with it, and this raises different and complex issues. Some
bare licenses are fully alienable (e.g., a typical movie ticket),
but some are inalienable (e.g., the invitation from one friend to
another to "drop in Tuesday night"). One of the plaintiffs' attorneys in Tasini persuasively argued that non-exclusive licenses in the patent area are not transferable.92 In my view,
neither the argument by analogy from patent law nor the
Copyright Act 3 fully resolves the issue of the privilege's puta-

9 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
17 U.S.C. § 201(c).

90

9,The fact that the collective-work copyright can be subdivided generates further complications: Can the privilege accompany each assignment? Can it also
remain with the seller so long as he retains any exclusive rights? I would suggest
the answer to both questions is "yes." If Publishing Company A receives an exclusive right to publish a collective work on the West Coast, but Publishing Company
B retains all other rights, both have "a copyright." Given the divisibility of copyright endorsed by the 1976 Act, it is probable that the privilege could inhere in
both. Although § 201(d)(2) does not mention "privileges" when it approves divisibility, it seems to contemplate that all copyright holders will be treated equally.
' See Alice Haemmerli, Commentary: Tasini v New York Times Co., 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 129, 133-40 (1998).
' The Copyright Act provides that "[any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106,
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live inalienability. However, that issue need not be reached if
there is no applicable privilege to transfer.
IV. ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

The Tasini decision not only operates prospectively, it also
imposes liability on publishers and database proprietors for
already-extant electronic versions. The publishers and database proprietors have been proceeding without appropriate
consent from the freelance copyright holders for some time.
Thus, the Tasini decision could cause some writings to disappear from the electronic record, either because an author is
reluctant to license them or because a publisher prefers purgmay be transferred." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). The Second Circuit hints that it believes that under the Copyright Act, only "rights," and not "privileges," can be
transferred. However, this cannot be correct because unless privileges constitute a
transferable component of copyright assignments, a buyer cannot use what he has
purchased. Section 106-the central grant of rights in the Copyright Act-is probably the source of the confusion because it mixes rights, privileges, and powers.
Section 106 provides that copyright owners have "the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize" certain acts in regard to their works. This phrasing does not distinguish
between rights and privileges:
Although section 106 employs only the word "rights," it uses that word
loosely, as synonymous with "entitlements." In fact, section 106 constitutes a simultaneous award of Hohfeldian rights, privileges, and powers
over the enumerated uses. Because the section 106 grants are "exclusive,"
the owner has the [Hohfeldian] right to exclude others from the physical
acts described. Because the section 106 grant includes an entitlement "to
do" the enumerated physical acts, creators have a [Hohfeldian] privilege
to use their creations in the manners specified. Because the grant awards
an entitlement "to authorize" the various physical acts, creators have a
[Hohfeldian] power to transfer their entitlements. Because creators hold
that power "exclusively]," they also have an immunity from other
persons' efforts to affect the legal status of the copyright. Thus, the intellectual property entitlements include, for example, the privilege to make
reproductions, the right to forbid strangers to make reproductions, and
the power to sell others a privilege to make reproductions.
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into The Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1366
(1989).
Admittedly, as the Second Circuit notes, a "right" in technical lawyers' language is not a "privilege," and Congress used both "right" and "privilege" with
distinct meanings in 201(c). Tasini II, 206 F.3d at 168 n.3. Moreover, also admittedly, the Act says nothing explicit about the transferability of "privileges." Id. at
168. But in everyday parlance, many of the Hohfeldian terms---"rights," "privileges," and "powers"--are collapsed into the catchall term "right." Sometimes the
same people who use Hohfeldian precision at one moment may use everyday language the next.
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ing to paying.94 It is sometimes argued, therefore, that Tasini
will cause unacceptable disruption of libraries and archives.
Although some excision from the electronic record is possible, the extent of such losses is easily exaggerated. It is doubtful that libraries have already come so unmoored from their
paper origins that the public record will be seriously impaired
by temporary gaps in the electronic record. Further, the National Writers Union offers a clearinghouse solution to provide
publishers and databases the licenses they need to keep most
of the record intact.9 5 Additionally, if the Supreme Court
cures the Second Circuit's arguable over-generosity, some of
the records could be retained as-is. 6
Moreover, and most importantly, it may be unwise to
adopt a principle that counsels surrender whenever powerful
entities, like major publishers, have induced the public to rely
on a continuance of the entities' unlawful behavior. As cases
like Tasini and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 7 illustrate, computer technology and the Internet community evolve
so quickly that behaviors of fairly clear illegality can spawn
institutions and customs before the courts can respond. Sometimes those new institutions and customs are desirable; sometimes they are not. However, regardless of their merit, the
speed of technological development may result in institutions
and customs that are costly to unravel. This, in effect, can empower one party to hold the public hostage.98

94 Withdrawing infringing material does not eliminate the obligation to pay for
past infringements, of course, but it does avoid liability for continuing infringements.
"5 See Publication Rights Clearinghouse, at http://www.nwu.org (last modified
Jan. 20, 2000).
"8 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (suggesting that reproduction
of magazines and newspapers in complete and exact form on computer has some
arguable claim to be privileged).
97 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
" For example, when one party unilaterally engages in unlawful behavior with
effects that are costly to unravel, society's interests are affected whatever course a
court chooses. Approving the behavior would be unjust, but undoing its effects may

impose costs on innocent third parties. Thus, in Tasini, it would be contrary to
law to approve everything that the publishers have done, but declaring their behavior infringing may result in libraries, researchers, and other innocent third
parties having to bear transaction costs and other burdens. Thus, a court might
understandably desire to avoid the social costs that would be entailed in undoing
the unlawful institution. However, yielding to this desire is like yielding to a hostage-taker: yielding to strength rather than to a claim of right.
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It is easy to be blinded by the interests of the affected
hostages, here the archivists and researchers. Nevertheless,
the long-term desirability of customs or institutions should be
assessed separately from the short-term costs that unraveling
them may impose."9 For example, it is possible that enforcing
the freelancers' rights will have permanent and positive incentive effects, increasing the quantity and quality of work produced. Consequently, researchers may receive far more in the
long run than they will lose during the transition period. Furthermore, of course, not all morality is subsumed in an economic calculus.
Nevertheless, custom is often legitimately relevant to legal
decision-making.' 0 Does this suggest that deference should
be given to the publishers' custom of engaging in electronic
distribution without consulting or paying the freelancers? The
response is negative, and threefold. First, the so-called custom
is unilateral. Second, the relevant statute attempts to limit the
relevance of changes in custom. 1 ' Third, the primary reason
that customs are often helpful to decision-makers-because
they provide useful information about efficiency-does not
apply to the publishers' practice of proceeding without obtaining specific consent from the copyright holders.
Regarding efficiency, the Coase Theorem suggests that
efficient patterns are likely to emerge when parties deal with
each other over a period of time, with good information and
low transaction costs among them.0 2 When these conditions
are present, a custom is likely to be a useful guide for how
resources should be used.0 3 The freelancers would argue that
" See supra note 98. Also note that this Essay touches on only one aspect of
the many relevant normative debates.
" See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press:

Custom And Law As Sources Of Property Rights In News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85,.8589 (1992).
101 Section 201(c) attempted to capture a set of practices and customs that
seemed fair to Congress at a particular time. As the 1976 House Report stated,
"The basic presumption of section 201(c) is fully consistent with present law and
practice, and represents a fair balancing of the equities." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
at 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, available at 1976 WL 14045.
Further, the statute explicitly states that the publisher "is presumed to have acquired only" the set of listed privileges. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
1"2 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
293 (1960).
10 By "resource use" or "resource allocation," I am referring to how physical or
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these Coasean conditions are not applicable because the
publishers' electronic practices occurred after the freelancers
sold the initial story rights; thus, the freelancers would face
prohibitive transaction costs in trying to affect the behavior.
The publishers would probably reply that because most of the
freelancers are repeat players, the condition of frequent interaction in a low transaction-cost setting was indeed satisfied.
However, both arguments would miss a deeper point. Interaction among parties can tell us something about desirable resource use, but it tells us nothing about what might be the
desirable distribution of the resulting gains.104 Thus, although the custom of electronic publishing may be desirable,
the custom of not paying for the privilege can easily change
without impeding the publishing itself. That is, no one denies
that electronic publication and distribution is a good thing-an
efficient use of resources. But, also, no one doubts that this
good thing will continue to occur after the freelancers' rights
are honored. The publishers may be more adept than individual authors at arranging for dissemination, but nothing suggests that the authors will have trouble identifying and locating the publishers as potential licensees."°5

human capacities are deployed, for example, whether a given field should be
planted in wheat or grazed by cattle or whether a given writer should spend her
days writing freelance newspaper articles or working for a public-relations firm.
...If a field's most efficient use is as a wheat field, and a person's most efficient use of her skills is as a farmer, then resource allocation is satisfied if she
plants wheat in that particular field. But whether she owns the field and its produce, or is merely an employee or tenant farmer, is primarily a "distributional"
issue.
1" It is sometimes argued that centralizing the control of intellectual properties
will increase efficiency. See generally Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Kitch argued that even aside from
incentives to invent, patent law provided desirable mechanisms for coordinating
follow-on research and other exploitation of inventions. At least one author has
tried to extend a related thesis into copyright, arguing that large corporations are
the best copyright owners because the biggest entities have the best distributional
and exploitation networks. See generally Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't
Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctrine To The Electronic
Publishing Media And Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1995). Rosenzweig suggests that in cases where contracts are ambiguous, it is best to construe new use
rights as going to publishers rather than to individual authors and artists, because
the corporations have better capacities for distribution and exploitation than do
the individuals, and because the individual creators have formed no expectations of
reward. Although Rosenzweig stops short of recommending that rights to CDROMS and online databases be resolved in this manner, Rosenzweig, supra, at

20001

TASINI AND A PUBLISHERS' PRESUMPTIVE PRIVILEGE

497

Also, to the extent that a publisher has superior knowledge about the value or imminence of a new technological use,
there will be asymmetric information when that publisher
meets a freelancer over the bargaining table. The § 201(c)
privilege is a default term; it is intended to fill gaps where ex930, the pro-centralization thesis warrants some attention.
Whatever the merits of the Kitch thesis in regard to organizing research and
development in the physical sciences, where simultaneous invention is common and
many of the investigative processes are likely to be chosen identically by similarlysituated researchers, the Kitch thesis has much less applicability in the cultural
realm. Each cultural product is likely to be unique and many are personal to their
authors. Moreover, it is uniformity rather than diversity that we have most to fear
in the cultural sphere. Finally, opting to favor the "best disseminator" can retard
initial creativity.
For example, consider the dispute between Warner Brothers and author
Dashiel Hammett over Hammett's desire to continue writing and selling stories
featuring the character he created, Sam Spade. In an ambiguous contract,
Hammett sold Warner Brothers certain rights in THE MALTESE FALCON, a successful novel featuring Sam Spade. Warner Brothers contended that the contract gave
it all rights to the character, and it sued when Hammett sold new stories and
conveyed some rights relating to Sam Spade to others. In a well-known decision,
the Ninth Circuit found that Hammett had retained rights over his character. See
Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954.). It
hardly seems plausible to argue, as a pro-centralization thesis would seem to suggest, that the public would have benefitted more if the corporation had won.
In some abstract world, perhaps, Warner Brothers could have hired Hammett
to write the story, and in that abstract world, perhaps, Warner Brothers could
have obtained as good and diverse results from Hammett-the-employee as
Hammett-the-independent-writer could produce on his own. In the real world, however, it is likely that Hammett produced better as an independent writer and that
depriving him of ownership would have decreased his creativity. That is, giving
the corporation the rights would have had a negative effect on how resources are
used. This can be usefully compared with the Tasini outcome, where affirming the
authors' electronic rights is likely to have no negative resource-allocative effects in
the long term.
But again, the central point to note is that the patterns of distribution will
not change much, if at all, if Tasini is affirmed. Indeed, freelancers will continue
to sell newspapers and magazines, and publishers, in turn, will utilize their distribution skills. The difference is that, after Tasini, the freelancers can demand payment for the extra value that electronic publishing gives their work. Whether the
demand would yield any extra money is a question of bargaining power.
These differences in income might have some incentive effect, but the question
is quite speculative. For example, there might be a small shift of income from
publishers as a group to authors as a group or there might be a small shift of
income from freelancers in general to the individual freelancers whose articles are
most often downloaded. Either side could speculate further about the incentive
effects of any income differences that did result. Would publishers be less likely to
experiment with new technology? Would skilled freelancers strongly increase their
output? Given the clear language of the statute, and the absence of any imminent
emergency, it seems unnecessary for a court to resolve these questions.
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plicit contractual specification is absent. One influential theory
of such terms suggests that defaults can usefully function to
push a party with better knowledge to be explicit.1 1 6 Thus,
one viewing § 201(c) from the perspective of the penalty theory
of defaults would argue in favor of excluding electronic rights
as a new and valuable use from the scope of the default privilege. If that were the rule, the publisher would have to raise
the issue during negotiations to contract for a right to use the
new technology. Such an approach-consistent with the Second
Circuit's holding in Tasini-would provide a mechanism for
alerting the less informed freelancer that there is something to
contract about, thereby mitigating the informational asymmetry. 107

Moreover, there is no prima facie moral reason to favor the
publisher over the author. To the contrary, the author has a
stronger claim of right on her side.' To the extent that the
court is concerned with gaps during the transition period, or
with the desirability of encouraging fast actors like the publishers to take advantage of new technology, alternatives are
available. For example, any injunctive relief could be limited so
that it functions prospectively only. Thus, a court-administered
scheme of monetary recovery for existing infringements-a
kind of retrospective compulsory license--could be a useful
result."9 The worst result would be to pretend that no infringement has occurred.

16 "Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party to the contract an

incentive to contract around the default. From an efficiency perspective, penalty
default rules can be justified as a way to encourage the production of information."
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989).
I I am indebted to Bob Bone for this formulation.
10 A full exploration of this issue is outside the scope of this Essay. For a
detailed discussion, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that creators have a moral claim, albeit limited, to ownership of their works).
1"9 The Court has hinted that it may be appropriate to deny injunctive relief
when public discourse is affected by copyright enforcement. See Campbell v AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994).
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CONCLUSION

In Tasini, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit
focused sufficiently on the express limitation in § 201(c), which
states that its distribution privilege applies only to distributions of individual works done "as part of' a collective
work.' Even if a privilege were available to allow a new collective work to be made, § 201 would not cover distribution of
the individually-owned articles, except in connection with the
whole collective work. Distribution out of context, as enabled
by the typical electronic service, is clearly not permissible
under § 201(c).
In Tasini, the Second Circuit held that the defendants'
infringed the freelancers' right of reproduction by making digital versions. Nevertheless, after Tasini, many actions remain
that are covered by the presumptive privilege. For example,
where not negated by the parties, the privilege under § 201(c)
allows the publisher of an encyclopedia to print and distribute
later editions, notwithstanding the copyright interests of individual contributors. Therefore, the question of the privilege's
alienability remains important.
For example, imagine that a print publisher is sold to a
larger company, or that two publishing companies merge and
transfer their assets to the new entity, or that the publisher of
many collective works decides to sell one of them (say, a magazine) to a new publisher. Congress would probably be shocked
to find out that the new owner of the collective work copyrights
would be forbidden from re-issuing them. Indeed, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA or WORLD BOOK

should not be required to

repurchase every freelance article in its volumes whenever
corporate ownership changes. This Essay does not address the
question of whether the privilege should be transferable "in
gross." This Essay does, however, argue that the § 201(c) privilege should be capable of accompanying any sale of copyright
in the full collective work. Indeed, the statutory language permits, and may even encourage, such a reading.
As for the gaps in the electronic record that the Tasini
decision may cause during a transition period, the affected
researchers can be analogized to innocent hostages. While
"' See supra text accompanying note 64.
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sometimes it may be necessary to pay ransom to safeguard
hostages, there are both ethical and incentive problems in surrendering to one party to protect another party whom the first
party's behavior has imperiled. The rule of law has some flexibility in it, but nothing about the facts in Tasini appears so
urgent that the Court should avert its attention from the
defendants' clearly infringing conduct. If the freelancers' copyrights are given their due, electronic publishing will still go
forward, and there might be an ethically and economically
desirable shift in incentive patterns as a result.

